通过父进程PID欺骗提升权限
编辑通过父进程PID欺骗提升权限
编辑识别用于创建提升的子进程的父进程欺骗。攻击者可能会欺骗新进程的父进程标识符 (PPID) 以逃避进程监控防御或提升权限。
规则类型: eql
规则索引:
- logs-endpoint.events.process-*
严重性: 高
风险评分: 73
每隔: 5m
搜索索引自: now-9m (日期数学格式，另请参见 额外回溯时间)
每次执行的最大警报数: 100
参考:
- https://gist.github.com/xpn/a057a26ec81e736518ee50848b9c2cd6
- https://blog.didierstevens.com/2017/03/20/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-updateprocthreadattribute
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1134.002/T1134.002.md
标签:
- 域：端点
- 操作系统：Windows
- 用例：威胁检测
- 战术：权限提升
- 数据源：Elastic Defend
版本: 7
规则作者:
- Elastic
规则许可证: Elastic License v2
规则查询
编辑/* This rule is compatible with Elastic Endpoint only */
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action == "start" and
/* process creation via seclogon */
process.parent.Ext.real.pid > 0 and
/* PrivEsc to SYSTEM */
user.id : "S-1-5-18" and
/* Common FPs - evasion via hollowing is possible, should be covered by code injection */
not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFaultSecure.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFaultSecure.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\Wermgr.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Wermgr.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\Download\\Install\\securityhealthsetup.exe") and
/* Logon Utilities */
not (process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Utilman.exe" and
process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe")) and
not process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe" and
not (process.code_signature.subject_name in
("philandro Software GmbH", "Freedom Scientific Inc.", "TeamViewer Germany GmbH", "Projector.is, Inc.",
"TeamViewer GmbH", "Cisco WebEx LLC", "Dell Inc") and process.code_signature.trusted == true) and
/* AM_Delta_Patch Windows Update */
not (process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\MpSigStub.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\MpSigStub.exe") and
process.parent.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\wuauclt.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\wuauclt.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\UUS\\Packages\\Preview\\*\\wuaucltcore.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\UUS\\amd64\\wuauclt.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\UUS\\amd64\\wuaucltcore.exe",
"?:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\UUS\\*\\wuaucltcore.exe")) and
not (process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\MpSigStub.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\MpSigStub.exe") and process.parent.executable == null) and
/* Other third party SW */
not process.parent.executable :
("?:\\Program Files (x86)\\HEAT Software\\HEAT Remote\\HEATRemoteServer.exe",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\VisualCron\\VisualCronService.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\BinaryDefense\\Vision\\Agent\\bds-vision-agent-app.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Tablet\\Wacom\\WacomHost.exe",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\LogMeIn\\x64\\LogMeIn.exe",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\EMC Captiva\\Captiva Cloud Runtime\\Emc.Captiva.WebCaptureRunner.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Freedom Scientific\\*.exe",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Google\\Chrome Remote Desktop\\*\\remoting_host.exe",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\GoToAssist Remote Support Customer\\*\\g2ax_comm_customer.exe") and
not (
process.code_signature.trusted == true and process.code_signature.subject_name == "Netwrix Corporation" and
process.name : "adcrcpy.exe" and process.parent.executable : (
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Netwrix Auditor\\Active Directory Auditing\\Netwrix.ADA.EventCollector.exe",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Netwrix Auditor\\Active Directory Auditing\\Netwrix.ADA.Analyzer.exe",
"?:\\Netwrix Auditor\\Active Directory Auditing\\Netwrix.ADA.EventCollector.exe"
)
)
框架: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
战术
- 名称：权限提升
- ID：TA0004
- 参考 URL：https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
-
技术
- 名称：访问令牌操作
- ID：T1134
- 参考 URL：https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/
-
子技术
- 名称：使用令牌创建进程
- ID：T1134.002
- 参考 URL：https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002/
-
子技术
- 名称：父进程PID欺骗
- ID：T1134.004
- 参考 URL：https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004/